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Part 1 What is religion? 
Three Positions 
What is religion, and does it have any legitimacy? There are many different 
answers to each of these questions, but ultimately any given answer to either question 
embodies one of three attitudes: 
1                   One of uncritical acceptance, such as we would 
presumably find among people living 3,500 
years ago; 
2                   One of rejection, such as we would find in 
someone, such as Freud, whose career involved 
examining religion, and therefore making an 
object out of it, as opposed to having religion; 
or 
3                   One of critical and reflective acceptance, such 
as we find in William James, Rudolph Otto, and 
Mircea Eliade, these being scholars who took it 
upon themselves to supplement critical 
scientific rationalism, such as we find in Freud, 
with firsthand knowledge of the experiences 
involved in being religious. 
In the present work, the views of James, Otto, and Eliade will be stated, 
compared, contrasted, and evaluated. It will be found that they have much the same 
view as to the emotional basis of religion and also as to its psychological function. In 
their view, the essence of religious sentiment is that this world is not all that there is 
and, moreover, that one cannot fail to have this view while retaining psychological 
health. Each of these authors acknowledges that there exist psychologically healthy, 
self-identified agnostics and atheists; but they also hold that such individuals, whether 
they know it or not, hold some variant of the view just described. They also hold that 
when people genuinely do not have this view, they succumb to various different forms 
of psychological morbidity. 
It must be stated at the outset that, when these authors refer to “religion”, they 
are typically referring to its subjective, emotional side, not to its objective, 
institutional side. At the same time, none of these authors is referring to the mindset of 
someone who, in the 21st century, describes himself as “spiritual.” For reasons to be 
discussed, the person who self-describes as “spiritual” is in much the same category as 
a self-described atheist. 21st Century ‘spiritualism’, so these authors would say, is just 
another manifestation of contemporary nihilism and is therefore not an expression of 
the actual spiritualism that these authors have in mind but of its absence. 
Let us start by describing the previously mentioned attitudes of uncritical 
acceptance, rejection, and critical acceptance. 
Uncritical acceptance 
Someone is genuinely uncritically accepting of religion if they don’t even know 
of the possibility of not accepting it. It is not possible for a member of any 
contemporary society to have this attitude. So-called “fundamentalists” are not 
uncritically accepting of religion. A contemporary Christian or Moslem 
fundamentalists chooses to be a fundamentalist. He lives in a society of non-
fundamentalists; he has access to books, newspapers, and websites that represent 
views antithetical to his own. The contemporary fundamentalist is reacting to non-
religious views and to religious but non-fundamentalists views. By contrast, the 
spiritualism of the stone age tribesman is not a reaction, that is to say, it is not a 
defense against some other view. 
Moreover, the tribesman’s views do not represent mere credulity or 
acquiescence to some set of social norms. In believing that some bolt of lightning 
represents the wrath of a higher being, he isn’t acquiescing to social norms or to a 
charismatic leader. He believes it because it is how he naturally sees the world, not 
because he has been taught that this is how he should see the world. The 
contemporary fundamentalist is in a very different category: his beliefs are the result 
of a long process of acculturation, usually accompanied by considerable internal 
struggle. 
Rejection 
There are two very different forms of religious rejectionism: the authentic kind 
and the inauthentic kind. An example of the authentic kind is someone, e.g. Freud, 
who genuinely has a rationalistic world view and, on that basis, simply doesn’t accept 
a religious world view. 
An example of the inauthentic kind is anyone whose rejectionism is simply a 
way of fitting in or moving ahead. People often join atheist groups because they want 
to fit in with others or because they believe membership in such a group to be a source 
of prestige. This form of rejectionism is presumably a historical consequence of the 
work of authentic rejectionists—as in, the latter changed our worldview in such a way 
as to make a non-religious view be socially normal—but the mentality involved is 
much closer that involved in religious fundamentalism than it is to that involved in 
authentic, rationalism-based rejectionism. 
In most cases, today’s atheist or secular humanist is simply following the herd, 
just as the true-believer was one thousand years ago, and his views are likely to be 
equally dogmatic. So even if what the contemporary atheist believes is more 
reasonable than what a medieval peasant believes, his reasons for believing it may 
well be equally emotional and equally spurious. Indeed, the brain-centers that mediate 
‘militant’ atheism are identical with those that mediate religious fundamentalism. 
Critical acceptance 
There are two ways to be reflective about religion: reductively and non-
reductively. Freud was reductively reflective about religion. In his view, God 
represents the father, and religion exists to mediate various biological and social 
functions (e.g. preventing incest, directing aggression towards appropriate targets, and 
inculcating superego). William James was non-reductively rational about religion. He 
didn’t deny that religions served (or used to serve) various social functions. Nor did 
he deny that religion was amenable to eliminative explanations of the kind that Freud 
would later provide. His position is not so much that those positions are wrong as it is 
that they are incomplete. There are indeed reductionist truths about religion, James 
grants, but there are also non-reductionist truths; and, so he claims, it is truths of the 
non-reductionist kind that the very essence of religion lies. 
It is important to note that there are, or at least could be, both 
reductive and non-reductive truths about religion. James himself makes this point. 
Religion is a psychological phenomenon and can be examined as such. It can be said 
why people are religious, just as it can be said why people do science. It could well be 
that Newton poured himself into his scientific researches as a way of fleeing from 
painful childhood memories, and it might well be that Martin Luther’s religious fervor 
is to be explained in much the same way. But, as James himself says, the 
psychological backstory is not always the whole story. Scientific positions must be 
understood on their own terms, and it is at least possible that the same is true of 
religious positions. Consequently, even if everything Freud says about religion is 
correct—even if God is simply a personification of superego and even if ‘holy 
injunctions’ are mere defenses against incestuous urges---it doesn’t follow that 
religion is nothing other than a giant neurosis. Supposing that Smith becomes a 
medical researcher because he suffers from terrible asthma, it doesn’t follow that his 
researches are nothing but expressions of asthma-related distress. Similarly, supposing 
that Martin Luther turned to God because his own father abandoned him as a child, it 
doesn’t follow that his subsequent religious activity is nothing but an expression of 
anguish over not having had a father. 
Of course, it will be said that, whereas science has both subjective and 
objective sides, religion is pure subjectivity, there being nothing real corresponding to 
the various psychological phenomena involved in it. But, of course, this is precisely 
what James, Otto, and Eliade question, and it is to their work that we now turn. 
In what follows, we will use the term ‘perceptible world’ to refer to the 
world qua entity that can be known through our senses and through scientific 
examination of the data thereby made available to us. It must be borne in mind that, in 
this context, ‘perceptible’ means ‘knowable either through our senses or through 
rational inference from what our senses disclose to us.’ 
  
Part 2 James’ position 
Religion vs. Science 
According to James, the essence of religion is that the perceptible world is not 
the whole world, since an ‘invisible order’ suffuses and undergirds the perceptible 
world, giving it meaning and moral structure:  
  
Were one asked to characterize the life of 
religion in the broadest and most general terms 
possible, one might say that it consists of the 
belief that there is an unseen order, and that our 
supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting 
ourselves thereto. This belief and this 
adjustment are the religious attitude in the 
soul.[1] 
  
This quotation explained: According to the scientific rationalist, the world is 
just a machine, consisting of so many parts governed by so many mechanisms, and is 
to be understood in much the same way as a machine. According to religion, says 
James, this is not the case, since the world known to us through our science is 
not all there is, the reason being there also exists an ‘invisible order’ that suffuses the 
perceptible Moreover, this invisible order gives the world meaning and it gives 
individual human beings a purpose. A given person’s life is meaningful to the extent 
that he is on the right side of this ‘invisible order’ and meaningless to the extent that 
he is on the wrong side of it. 
Religion as Psychologically Necessary 
Notice that, in this particular quotation, James is expressing a value-judgment; 
he is just saying what, in his view, the essence of religion is.  But it is the very 
purpose of this work of James to express a value-judgment about this conceit: and that 
judgment is that even if it is false, we benefit from believing it to be true. James’ 
argument is that, even if God does not in fact exist, belief in God gives one a certain 
measure of God-like strength. In a word—believing it makes it real:  
  
We can act AS IF there were a God; feel AS IF 
we were free; consider Nature AS IF she were 
full of special designs; lay plans AS IF we were 
to be immortal; and we find then that these 
words do make a genuine difference in our 
moral life. Our faith THAT these unintelligible 
objects actually exist proves thus to be a full 
equivalent in praktischer Hinsicht, as Kant calls 
it, or from the point of view of our action, for a 
knowledge of WHAT they might be, in case we 
were permitted positively to conceive them. So 
we have the strange phenomenon, as Kant 
